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Abstract 
In case of price-regulated companies it is the role of appropriate government 
agencies to introduce clear, internally consistent, theoretically sound, and 
unambiguous methodology for finding the regulative cost of capital. The aim of the 
paper is to describe and analyze the cost of capital estimation methodology for 
regulated companies in Estonia and discuss some issues arising in applying this 
methodology. The current paper focuses on two topical issues associated with the 
estimation of regulative cost of capital in Estonia: estimation of market risk 
premium and inclusion of currency risk premium into the cost of capital. Current 
turmoil in financial markets has increased investors’ risk aversion as well as level of 
risks.  
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Introduction 
There are some industries that are said to be natural monopolies. In such industries 
one firm can produce a desired output at a lower social cost than two or more firms. 
Mostly these are the industries where business is based on transmission networks 
(railways, telecommunications, public utilities etc). As with other monopolies, a 
monopolist who has gained its position through natural monopoly effects may 
engage in behavior that abuses its market position (e.g. charge a far higher price than 
justified by the production costs and earn an excess profit on its capital). Therefore 
such industries are often subject to government price regulation.  
The regulated price (plus possible subsidies from the government) should cover all 
the costs of necessary production inputs including the cost of capital. In case of 
monopolistic companies a target rate of return pricing is often used. In a competitive 
market most companies are not able to earn rate of return above their cost of capital 
continually. Therefore many regulators follow closely the cost of capital of regulated 
utilities in their price regulation activities.  
The cost of capital can be defined as the minimum rate of return required by the 
investor on some specific investment. If the expected rate of return on the 
investment project is lower than the cost of capital, such a project should be rejected 
according to the value maximization principle. The latter is the cornerstone of 
modern financial theory (Jensen 2002) 
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There are many different approaches how to estimate the cost of capital (especially 
ambiguous is the estimation of cost of equity) and while some methods are more 
“theoretically” sound than others, their implementation still raises many questions. 
In case of price regulation, any ambiguity can lead to a dispute between the 
regulator, the company and its customers. In order to reduce ambiguity, Ministry of 
Economy and Communication as well as Estonian Competition Authority have 
developed a methodology how to estimate the cost of capital in regulated 
companies. Despite their efforts some issues still remain open and forensic debates 
are not uncommon. 
The aim of the paper is to describe and analyze the cost of capital estimation 
methodology for regulated companies in Estonia and discuss some issues arising in 
application of this methodology.  
The paper is structured as follows. First section discusses main distinctive features 
of cost of capital estimation in regulated industries based on previous literature. 
Then, the methodology for estimating the cost of capital developed and used by 
Estonian regulators will be described. The last section analyzes some problems 
arising in applying this methodology in practice as well as proposes possible 
solutions to them. 
The distinctive features of cost of capital estimation in regulated industries 
Literature about cost of capital and rate regulation list many distinctive features of 
cost of capital estimation in regulated companies. The following summarizes only 
the most important ones. 
The first distinctive feature of estimating the cost of capital in price regulated 
industries is that the cost of capital affects the price of the product and thereby also 
operating cash flows of the company and the actual rate of return. In a competitive 
market the market forces should bring the rate of return to its equilibrium, i.e. to the 
state where in the long run the rate of return equals the cost of capital. Most price 
regulated companies operate as natural monopolies, i.e. without any competition. 
Therefore the price regulators use the cost of capital figure as benchmark for 
accepted rate of return and set prices according to that. According to Pedell (2006) 
the assessment of cost of capital directly affects the cash flows of the regulated 
utility. The cash flows and their expected variability on the other hand influence 
market value and risk-adjusted cost of capital of the regulated utility, which 
introduces a specific circularity problem of rate regulation in the cost of capital 
assessment. Such circularity prevents of using market value of debt and equity as the 
regulatory rate bases and forces to rely on book values instead. Conventional 
regulatory “cost of capital” is therefore based on book value weights (Patterson 
1995). Circularity issue also hinders the estimation of cost of equity by using 
Market-to-Book Ratios or DCF Models (Ibid.).
Next distinctive feature is that the regulatory commission has to take into account an 
appropriate risk-adjusted cost of capital when calculating prices, and, at the same 347
time, its directives are one of the major risk drivers or even the most important risk 
driver for the regulated firm (Robichek 1978; Pedell 2006). The appropriate estimate 
of cost of capital for regulated firm should take into account how the regulation 
affects the risk level of the company. In case of a perfect rate-of-return regulation 
that would guarantee the regulated firm a pre-specified rate of return on all 
investment at any moment of time all risks would vanish and the appropriate cost of 
capital would be risk-free interest rate (Patterson 1995). This, however, is hardly a 
case in practice as it would require perfect information as well as continuous 
adjustments in regulated prices (Ibid.). In practice, while through regulation the 
company is promised to earn the pre-specified rate of return, the regulation itself 
creates so-called asymmetric risks. If prices are fixed by the regulatory commission 
for a certain period, the regulated firm cannot adjust to (unexpected) changes on its 
selling market neither can it adjust its output prices flexibly to fluctuations in input 
prices (Pedell 2006). Partly this problem can be mitigated by pass-through clauses 
for certain (exogenous) cost elements or by indexation of rates (Ibid.). Pedell (2006) 
reviews in his book several previously published papers and concludes that 
empirical evidence is not unanimous, but tends to indicate that systematic risk is 
reduced by rate regulation and confirm the buffering hypothesis formulated by 
Peltman in 1976.  
Another distinctive feature of estimating the cost of capital in price regulated 
industries is that the tax advantage of debt is usually not taken into the account when 
estimating the cost of capital (Patterson 1995; Armitage 2005). Under the classical 
corporate tax system, the interests on debt capital are viewed as business expenses 
and hence not taxed at corporate level, while payments to shareholders (i.e. 
dividends) are made from the after-tax profit. Therefore the use of debt capital 
reduces company’s tax burden and increases the after-tax free cash flows as well as 
the value of the company (at least to some extent). In case of regulated industries 
any tax savings from the use of debt usually benefit the consumers instead of 
owners. Estonia introduced distributed corporate profit taxation system in 2000 and 
under such a system debt capital has no tax advantage in most cases
2. Therefore the 
further analysis of this feature in the context of current article is not necessary. 
And the last distinctive feature is the fact that there is regulation for estimating the 
cost of capital per se. Modern finance theory provides many different approaches to 
estimate the cost of capital, which may also lead to rather different estimates of 
WACC. In case of price regulation, however, there should be unambiguous rules that 
must be followed when estimating the cost of capital. In the next section the 
methodology used by price regulators in Estonia (e.g. Estonian Competition 
Authority and Estonian Technical Surveillance Authority) will be described and 
analyzed.  
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Regulation for estimation of the cost of capital in regulated companies in 
Estonia
This part of the article is mainly based on the regulative act formulated by the 
minister of economy and communication on how to calculate the charges for the use 
of railway infrastructure (RTL 2008, 36, 522)
3. The current version of the regulation 
will be compared with the previous one (valid between June 14, 2004 and May 25, 
2008) as well as usual practice in non-regulated companies. 
The cost of capital for railway infrastructure should be calculated by the following 
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where re denotes the cost of equity, rd denotes the cost of debt, E denotes the amount 
of equity and D denotes the amount of interest-bearing liabilities. The proportion of 
debt capital of the railway infrastructure company should be at least 50%. If the 
actual share of debt capital is higher the actual proportions will be used (RTL 2008, 
36, 522, § 7, lg. 4).  
The formula for calculating the cost of capital in non-regulated companies is 
basically the same as formula (1), but may include also other sources of capital (e.g. 
preferred shares, convertible bonds etc) (Bruner et al. 1998). The question arises 
whether the price regulated company using also other sources of capital besides 
vanilla debt and common shares could take them into the account when estimating 
its cost of capital or not. The common sense suggests that this should be allowed; 
however the regulation does not provide model and methods to estimate the cost of 
hybrid instruments correctly. Fortunately, this problem is not very important in 
practice as Estonian companies usually rely on vanilla debt (mostly in form of bank 
loans or leasing) and equity in form of common shares. In countries with traditional 
taxation of corporate profit the cost of debt should be calculated on after-tax basis 
(Vernimmen et al. 2005). In regulated companies, however, the usual practice is to 
calculate the cost of debt on pre-tax basis (Patterson 1995; Armitage 2005) similar to 
formula (1). The cost of capital regulation specifies also the capital structure to be 
used in formula (1). In case of non-regulated companies usually the actual or target 
capital structure is used (Bruner et al. 1998). While the financial theory mostly 
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suggests using proportions based on market values, book values are sometimes used 
in practice (Sander 2003).  
There are several methods which can be used to estimate the cost of equity. Most 
often in financial literature we can find following approaches (Clayman et al. 2008; 
Vernimmen et al. 2005; Copeland et al. 2000):
x Capital Assets Pricing Model (CAPM) approach, 
x Dividend Discount Model approach, 
x Bond Yield Plus Risk Premium approach, 
x Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) approach.  
Of these four approaches financial advisors use most often the CAPM (Bruner et al.
1998; Pereiro 2002). However, the application of the plain CAPM to emerging 
markets is a controversial endeavour (Pereiro 2002). Therefore several CAPM-based 
variants have been emerged for those markets. The survey conducted six years ago 
among Estonian financial advisors and investment banks also confirmed the 
popularity of CAPM (Sander 2003). In Estonia, five analysts out of six claimed to 
use classical Capital Assets Pricing Model (Ibid.).  
Both the current and previous version of regulation for estimation the cost of capital 
in regulated companies in Estonia, prescribe the use of CAPM for estimating the 
cost of equity (RTL 2008, 36, 522, § 7, lg. 2) as follows: 
(2) m r f r e r u    E ,
where rf denotes the risk-free rate, E denotes the systematic risk of the company, and 
rm denotes the market risk premium. This model is also used by regulatory bodies in 
other countries (e.g. in the UK, regulatory bodies have almost exclusively relied 
upon CAPM (Jenkinson 2008), in the U.S. the single-stage DCF method
4 for 
estimating the cost of equity was replaced with multi-stage DCF and CAPM in 2008 
(Surface Transportation Board … 2009)). The same formula (2) is also used in non-
regulated companies.  
While both regulated and non-regulated companies use the same formula, the 
estimation of its components is rather different. The table 1 compares the current 
regulation with the previous regulation and with common practice in non-regulated 
companies. 
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Table 1. Guidelines for estimating the CAPM components 

































The average yield of the 
10-year government 
bond with the highest 
credit rating in Euro 
zone during the last five 
years should be used 
(RTL 2008, 36, 522, § 7, 
lg. 2). 
The risk-free rate is 
estimated by adding to 
the average interest rate 
of the 10-year 
government bond with 
the highest credit rating 
in Euro zone during the 
last five years the 
country risk premium. 
In case Estonian 
government has issued 
long-term bonds, their 
interest rate can be used 
instead (RTL 2004, 74, 
1213, § 7, lg. 2). 
Usually the yield to 
maturity (YTM) of long-
term government bond 
is used as the benchmark 
for risk-free rate of 
return (the use of 10-
year government bond is 
often recommended). At 
any given point of time 
risk-free rates in 
different currencies may 
be different. One should 
match the currency of 








































The systematic risk of 
the railway company is 
estimated based on the 
arithmetic average beta 
of listed railways 
companies in a manner 
that reflects the risks 
associated with that 
particular railway 
company (RTL 2008, 
36, 522, § 7, lg. 2). 
The systematic risk of 
the railway company is 
estimated according to 
the betas of comparable 
companies that own 
railway infrastructure 
and have monopolistic 
power. The beta should 
reflect the risks 
associated with that 
particular railway 
company (RTL 2004, 
74, 1213, § 7, lg. 2). 
In case of listed 
companies, systematic 
risk can be estimated 




(Bruner et al. 1998). In 
case of non-listed 
companies betas of 
comparable firms or 

























The market risk 
premium is estimated as 
the arithmetic average 
of long-term market risk 
premiums in U.S. and 
European markets (RTL 
2008, 36, 522, § 7, lg. 
2).
The market risk 
premium is estimated 
based on long-term 
market risk premiums in 
U.S. and European 
markets (RTL 2004, 74, 
1213,§ 7, lg. 2). 
In theory, the market 
risk premium should be 
forward-looking
(Damodaran 2008a). In 
practice most analysts 
use either historical 
mean or fixed rates 
(Bruner et al. 1998) 351
According to the current regulation the cost of debt (rd) should be estimated as the 
weighted average interest rate of the interest-bearing debt of railway infrastructure 
company in previous fiscal year (RTL 2008, 36, 522, § 7, lg. 3). The previous 
regulation was rather different by stating that the cost of debt should be calculated 
by adding to the five year average interest rate of 10-year government bond with the 
highest credit rating in Euro zone, the risk premium for the country risk and for the 
company risk. The country risk premium had to be estimated based on credit rating 
of Estonia. If Estonia has issued long-term government bonds, one can add company 
risk premium to its interest rates to estimate the cost of debt (RTL 2004, 74, 1213,§ 
7, lg. 3). Financial theory on the other hand usually recommends of using interest 
rates at which the company is able to borrow the money at the moment (Pereiro 
2002). Still, some analysts use historical costs of debt (Bruner at al. 1998). 
When we compare the current regulation for the estimation of cost of capital with 
financial theory, we can conclude that in major part they coincide, but there are 
many differences in details and as one old saying state: “the devil lies in details”. 
Some topical issues in estimating the regulatory cost of capital 
The global financial and economic crisis has caused the premiums for bearing 
different kind of risks to jump to somewhat unprecedented heights. Historically, the 
market risk premium (calculated as the geometric average) has been around 3%-5% 
(Dimson et al. 2006). Currently, forward-looking risk premiums estimated by 
different sources are around 7.5-10% (see table 2), i.e. double of their historical 
averages.  
Table 2. Forward-looking market risk premium in January 2009 
Source  Estimated risk premium 
Associés en Finance  9.60% 
Bloomberg 7.46% 
Factset 8.00% 
Fairness Finance  8.15% 
Source: The Vernimmen.Com Newsletter, January 2009. 
The problem is that not only has the forward-looking market risk premium gone up, 
but historical market risk premium has decreased. The historical or ex-post risk 
premium is calculated as the difference between the actual return of a stock market 
index and actual return of risk-free instrument (usually government bond). The 
fundamental linkage between forward-looking and historical risk premiums is 
following. The uncertainty about future prospects of financial markets or investors’ 
risk aversion increases and that will lead to higher forward-looking risk premiums 
and discount rates. Higher discount rates cause share prices to drop and realized 
rates to decrease. This, in turn, means that historical risk premium, calculated as 
showed in the text above, decreases. The following table 3 shows that if we use a 
short estimation period, the ex-post risk premium might even turn out negative! By 352
accepting such result we are essentially saying that investors should be satisfied if 
the value of their risky assets decreases.  
Table 3. Estimation of historical market risk premiums 
Market Risk Premium 
The Estimation Period  Arithmetic Average  Geometric Average 
1928-2008 5.65%  3.88% 
1959-2008 3.33%  2.29% 
1999-2008 -6.26%  -7.96% 
Source: Adopted from Damodaran 2009. 
In his analysis Estonian Technical Surveillance Authority has used the estimation 
period of five years. This is clearly not long enough. While the longer estimation 
period does not eliminate the contradiction between forward-looking and ex-post
risk premiums, it clearly reduces the problem.  
Another issue, which topicality has recently increased, is whether the currency risk 
premium should be taken into the account when estimating the cost of capital for 
regulated companies. Currency risk premium affects both the cost of equity and cost 
of debt. According to Damodaran (2008b), it is quite common practice that when 
there are no long term government bonds in the local currency that are widely 
traded, analysts decide that is easier to estimate risk-free rates and risk premiums in 
a mature market currency. However currency mismatch (i.e. situation when cash 
flows and discount rates are not in the same currency) can lead to serious problems 
(Ibid.). Risk-free rates in different currencies can be rather different (see e.g. table 
4).
Table 4. Risk-free rates in main currencies (as of February 10, 2009) 
Country (currency)  Maturity  
U.S. ($)  Germany (€)  U.K. (£) Japan  (¥)
1 year  0.56%  1.08%  1.14%  0.32% 
5 years  1.41%  2.41%  2.83%  0.76% 
10 years  2.94%  3.37%  3.91%  1.31% 
Source: www.bloomberg.com 
During 2000-2006, the differences in interest rates of EEK and EUR denominated 
bank deposits were quite low. However, since the mid-year of 2007 the currency risk 
premium started to rise at fast pace and currently (i.e. beginning of 2009) interest 
rates of bank deposits denominated in EEK are approximately 300 basic points 

































































































































































































Figure. 1. Currency Risk Premium based on interest rate difference between EEK 
and EUR denominated deposits in Estonian commercial banks 1999-2008. (Bank of 
Estonia)
This is a sign that investors do not eliminate the possibility for devaluation of 
Estonian local currency, despite the fact that Estonia follows fixed exchange rate 
system with currency board. In the history, there have been occasions when even 
countries with currency board systems were forced to devaluate their currencies (like 
Argentina in 2002). 
Current regulation for estimation the cost of capital in regulated industries does not 
permit to take currency risk into account when estimating the cost of equity (see the 
rules for estimation of CAPM components in table 1). The previous regulation, 
however, did allow the premium for bearing country risk. One component of country 
risk is the possibility of currency devaluation – that is, currency risk (Pereiro 2002). 
According to the current regulation, the currency risk premium gets reflected in the 
cost of debt only when company has taken loans denominated in local currency 
because the cost of debt is currently estimated for regulated companies as the 
weighted average interest rate of the interest-bearing debt in previous fiscal year (§ 
7, lg. 3). Under the previous regulation, the currency risk could be considered as a 
part of country risk, for which specific risk premium was intended for. 
It is a matter of discussion whether the investors or consumers of regulated 
companies should bear the currency risk. However, the current regulation encourage 
regulated companies to take loans nominated in local currency as this is the only 
way how the currency risk could be passed to consumers.  354
Conclusions 
There are companies that operate as natural monopolies. For those companies the 
government usually creates such a regulation that tries to simulate the environment 
of competitive markets. In their price regulative activities authorities follow closely 
the cost of capital of regulated companies to ensure that natural monopolies have no 
opportunity to earn return in excess of that. The financial theory does not have fully 
unified methodology for estimating the cost of capital. Such ambiguity, however, is 
not possible in case of regulated industries. Therefore, appropriate government 
agencies should constitute clear, internally consistent, theoretically sound, and 
unambiguous methodology for finding the regulative cost of capital. The circularity 
problem, inherent to the estimation of cost of capital for regulated companies, is the 
main issue that restricts of using exactly the same methodology as for non-regulated 
companies.  
In Estonia, new methodology for estimating the cost of capital in price regulated 
companies was introduced recently. While the main principles did not change and 
the models are basically the same as most popular ones for non-regulated 
companies, there had been some important changes in details. Changes affected the 
estimation of components of CAPM as well as the estimation of the cost of debt. 
While the changes, which were put into effect, increased the unambiguousness of 
the methodology, they also gave rise to some additional issues.  
Under the current regulation, it is difficult for investors in price regulated companies 
to get fairly compensated for bearing currency risk. Financial theory suggests that 
both cash flows and cost of capital should be in the same currency. However, the 
current regulation does not permit to take currency risk into account when 
estimating the cost of equity. In case of debt capital, the currency mismatch remains 
if a company uses loans denominated in foreign currency. Lately, financial markets 
have become more concerned about possible devaluation of Estonian Kroon despite 
the fact that Estonia is following currency board system. The interest rate differences 
between EUR and EEK denominated deposits have increase up to 300 basic points.  
Another topical issue stems from the fact while in theory market risk premium 
should be forward-looking in practice usually ex-post (i.e. historical) risk premiums 
are used. While under the normal circumstance, if the estimation horizon is long 
enough, such a contradiction does not create any problem; the same does not hold 
when investors became very risk averse. Under the latter scenario forward-looking 
and ex-post risk premiums move in opposite direction. In order to reduce possible 
problems the time horizon for estimating ex-post risk premiums should be long and 
the rules for estimating the cost of capital in regulated companies should not change 
over time. Frequent changes in regulations create additional systematic risk for 
price-regulated companies and could also increase the cost of capital in those 
companies.  355
References 
1. Armitage, S. (2005). The Cost of Capital: Intermediate Theory. Cambridge 
University Press, 353 p. 
2. Bruner, R. F. Eades, K. M. Harris, R. S., Higgins, R. C. (1998). Best 
Practices in Estimating the Cost of Capital: Survey and Synthesis. In Financial 
Practice and Education. Spring/Summer, pp. 13-28.  
3. Clayman, M. R., Fridson, M. S., Troughton, G. H. (2008). Corporate 
Finance: a Practical Approach. John Wiley & Sons, 451 p. 
4. Copeland, T., Koller, T., Murrin, J. (2000). Valuation: Measuring and 
Managing the Value of Companies. John Wiley & Sons, 483 p. 
5. Damodaran, A. (2008a). Equity Risk Premiums (ERP): Determinants, 
Estimation and Implications. 77 p. http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/ 
pdfiles/papers/ERPfull.pdf. 
6. Damodaran, A. (2008b). What is the riskfree rate? A Search for the Basic 
Building Blocks. 33 p. http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/pdfiles/papers/ 
riskfreerate.pdf.
7. Dimson, E., Marsh, P., Staunton, M. (2006). The Worldwide Equity Premium: 
A Smaller Puzzle. EFA 2006 Zurich Meetings Paper; AFA 2008 New Orleans 
Meetings Paper. http://ssrn.com/abstract=891620.
8. Elektrienergia ja põlevkivi tootmise hinnaregulatsiooni põhimõtted 2008, 
http://www.konkurentsiamet.ee/file.php?12192. 
9. Elektrienergia võrgutasude arvutamise ühtne metoodika 2008, 
http://www.konkurentsiamet.ee/file.php?13031. 
10. Gaasi võrguteenuste hindade arvutamise ühtne metoodika 2006, 
http://www.konkurentsiamet.ee/file.php?12201. 
11. Jenkinson, T. (2008). Regulation and the Cost of Capital. In International 
Handbook on Economic Regulation. Crew, M., Parker, D. (Eds.) Edward Elgar, 
London, 405 p. 
12. Jensen, M. (2002). Value maximization, stakeholder theory, and the corporate 
objective function. – Business Ethics Quarterly, Vol. 12. pp. 235-256. 
13. Kodutarbijatele müüdava gaasi piirhindade arvutamise ühtne metoodika 2006, 
http://www.konkurentsiamet.ee/file.php?12202. 
14. Patterson, C. S. (1995). The Cost of Capital. Theory and Estimation. Quorum 
Books, 315 p. 
15. Pedell, B. (2006). Regulatory Risk and the Cost of Capital. Springer, Berlin, 
226 p.
16. Pereiro, L. E. (2002). Valuation of Companies in Emerging Markets. John 
Wiley & Sons, 507 p. 
17. Raudteeinfrastruktuuri kasutustasu arvestamise metoodika. (2008). Riigi Teataja 
Lisa, 36, 522, https://www.riigiteataja.ee/ert/act.jsp?id=12957559. 
18. Raudteeinfrastruktuuri kasutustasu arvestamise metoodika. (2004). Riigi Teataja 
Lisa, 74, 1213, https://www.riigiteataja.ee/ert/act.jsp?id=767103. 
19. Robichek, A. A. (1978). Regulation and Modern Finance Theory. – Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 693-705. 
20. Sander, P. (2003). Estimating the Cost of Capital in Emerging Markets 
Estonian experiences – Finance in EU Accession Countries: Experiences and 356
Solutions. VI International Scientific Conference, Proceedings, Vol. 1. Tartu 
Ülikooli Kirjastus, pp. 188-199.  
21. Sander, P. (2005). Laenukapitali maksueelis Eestis – müüt või reaalsus – Eesti 
ettevõtluse perspektiivid Euroopa Liidus. III teadus- ja koolituskonverents,
Pärnu-Tallinn: Mattimar, pp. 169-177. 
22. Soojuse piirhinna kooskõlastamise põhimõtted 2008, 
http://www.konkurentsiamet.ee/file.php?12757. 
23. Surface Transportation Board revises its Cost of Capital Methodology. Press 
Release 28.01.2009, No. 09-02, http://www.stb.dot.gov/__85256593004F576F 
.nsf/0/ 3551C8B4A52126478525754C0072C406?OpenDocument. 
24. The Vernimmen.com Newletter, January 2009, http://www.vernimmen.com 
/letter/newsletter-articles-finance/letter_38.php#actualite 
25. Vernimmen, P., Quiry, P., Le Fur, Y., Dallacchio, M.m Salvi, A. (2005). 
Corporate Finance. Theory and Practice. John Wiley & Sons, 1030 p. 